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THE ROLE OF THE OBJECTOR IN CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS-A CASE STUDY
OF THE GENERAL MOTORS TRUCK "SIDE
SADDLE" FUEL TANK LITIGATION
Robert B. Gerard* & Scott A. Johnson**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of class-action litigation, an "objector" is a class
member who formally challenges a proposed class action settlement
on the ground that the settlement is not in the best interests of some
or all of the class members. Because of the way courts now handle
class action settlements, an objector's role in protecting the interests
of the class can be of critical importance. This role can also involve
ethical and economic dilemmas that can compromise or bankrupt the
objector. For a quick grasp of the complexities involved in the objec-
tor's role, consider the following hypothetical.
A. The ABC Class Action
ABC, a large automobile manufacturer, becomes the target of
numerous class actions which allege that some of its vehicles have a
design defect that makes them prone to burst into flames in a colli-
sion. ABC denies any such defect, but because it has sold millions of
the vehicles, it faces potentially ruinous liability if it must recall or
repair the vehicles.
* B.A., S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook, 1977, J.D. University of San Diego School
of Law, 1980. Mr. Gerard is admitted to practice law in California and Nevada.
Mr. Gerard's experience in Mass Torts/Class Action Litigation began in 1987
with representation of plaintiffs in the Shell Oil Plastic Pipe Litigation.
** J.D., cum laude, University of San Diego School of Law, 1981. Mr. John-
son has a business litigation practice with the Law Offices of Andrew B. Kaplan,
in San Diego, California. He clerked for the Honorable Gerald Brown, Presiding
Justice of the California Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. One), from 1982
to 1984.
1. See General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W. 2d 949, 952-53 (Tex. 1996).
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To avoid this result, ABC approaches the plaintiffs' lawyers in
one of the class actions and proposes a nationwide settlement. In ex-
change for dismissal of all claims related to the alleged safety defect,
ABC will give each class member a coupon, good for $1000 off the
price of a new ABC vehicle. Additionally, ABC will agree to award
plaintiffs' attorneys a little more than $9 million in fees. The plain-
tiffs' attorneys agree to this settlement. The trial court accepts the
settlement.
Troubled because ABC has made no attempt to remedy the
safety defect and has made no cash payment to class members, and
troubled by the apparent conflict of interest created by ABC's will-
ingness to pay such staggering fees to class counsel, some of the class
members object to the settlement. They eventually convince a court
of appeals to throw out the settlement and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings. ABC and class counsel decide to take the settle-
ment to a new forum.
Specifically, they go to a small court in a state where one of the
other class actions against ABC had been filed, and where they be-
lieve the judge favors class action settlements. ABC then agrees to
increase the attorneys' fee award so that the counsel in the new state
can be included, and so that counsel for the objectors can share in the
award. Faced with smiling attorneys, all of whom praise the settle-
ment, and with many of the objectors now acting as proponents, the
state court issues a judgment approving the settlement. ABC can
then take that judgment to all of the other states where the class ac-
tions were filed and argue that it must be given full faith and credit,
thereby disposing of all claims against it throughout the country.!
This arrangement works for almost everyone. ABC has extin-
guished potentially massive liability, and in so doing has helped en-
courage future sales of its vehicles to class members who will feel ob-
ligated to use the coupons. Class counsel have reaped an award of
millions of dollars, without significant work or risk, and counsel for
the previous objectors share in that award. The courts have unwieldy
and time-consuming litigation removed from their already congested
calendars.
This leaves only the class members without any substantial
benefit, but no one remains to speak for the class's interests-no one
except the objector.
2- See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873, 877 (1996).
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B. The General Motors Class Action
The machinations described above are not the product of the
authors' imaginations. Something very close to this is actually occur-
ring in the General Motors Truck "Side-Saddle" litigation,3 in which
the authors have acted as counsel of record to a group of objectors.
Consumer activist Ralph Nader, in his recent book entitled No Con-
test, charged that:
Since 1973, more than thirteen hundred people have been
killed in fiery crashes involving pickup trucks that General
Motors manufactured .... More than 650 of these deaths
were caused by fire rather than trauma-that is, the occu-
pant of the truck survived the crash but was burned alive by
the subsequent fire. Critics contend that the location of the
fuel tanks in these trucks renders them unsafe.4
Nonetheless, pursuant to a settlement entered into with class counsel,
General Motors appears to have disposed of all class actions brought
against it with a "coupon" deal. As described by Mr. Nader:
Under the proposed settlement-a cynical arrangement be-
tween corporate and plaintiff lawyers if there ever was
one-owners of the trucks would have received only a cou-
pon providing for a $1,000 discount on the purchase of a
new GM truck, while their lawyers would have received $9.5
million in cash fees.5
Since Mr. Nader wrote his book, the settlement has been modified-
the class is still getting only a $1000 coupon, which may have a market
value of $100, but class counsel will now receive $26,075,000 in fees! The
only remaining impediments to the settlement are two appeals filed by a
few groups of remaining objectors. This Essay will review the law related
to class-action settlements, the abuses which can occur under that law, and
the role of the objector in trying to protect against such abuses. The Essay
will then detail the history of the General Motors class action, which serves
as a striking example of the problems inherent in class action settlements,
and of the necessity-and dangers-of the objector's role.
3. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768,777 (3d Cir. 1995).
4. RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE
LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 194 (1996) (endnote
omitted).
5. Id. at 195.
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II. THE LAW GOVERNING CLASS AcrION SETTLEMENTS
A. FRCP Rule 23
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 23")
governs federal class actions.6 Most states have class-action statutes
modeled on Rule 23.! Rule 23(a) allows a class member to sue as a
representative on behalf of the class if:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) [T]here are questions of law or fact common to the
class;
(3) [T]he claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) [T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.8
In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a), parties seeking class certifi-
cation must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1),
(2) or (3).9 Specifically, the court must make one of the following
findings: (1) that prosecution of separate actions by class members
would create a risk of inconsistent and incompatible adjudication§ or
would result in adjudications that would dispose of claims of class
members who were not parties to the litigation; or (2) that the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, making injunctive or declaratory relief affect-
ing the entire class appropriate; or (3) that the questions of law or
fact common to the class predominate over questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is a superior means for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
Rule 23(e) and the similar state statutes also contain a require-
ment designed to protect class members against potentially collusive
settlements: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dis-
missal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (West 1997).
7. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 382 (West 1997); LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 594 (West 1960 & Supp. 1997).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
9. See id. at 23(b)(1)-(3).
10. See id.
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such manner as the court directs."'" The requirement of court ap-
proval of class-action settlements raised two issues which have re-
sulted in conflicting decisions in the courts of appeal. First, before a
court can approve a settlement, must it initially certify that a class
satisfying the requisites of Rule 23(a) and (b) exists, or does the set-
tlement justify imposition of a lesser standard for certifying a class as
a "settlement class?' '12 Second, if a class-action settlement is ap-
proved by a court, is the judgment of that court entitled to full faith
and credit in all courts of the United States, even if it extinguishes
claims that could not have been brought in the court where the set-
tlement was entered?'
B. The Settlement Class Is Rejected
A number of court of appeals decisions have held that a settle-
ment obviates or reduces the need to determine whether a proposed
class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).4 Other courts
of appeals, notably the Third Circuit, have held that a class cannot be
certified for settlement unless certification for trial is warranted-
that is, unless Rule 23(a) and (b) are satisfied.
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,6 the United States Su-
preme Court sided with the Third Circuit. The Court observed that
some of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) "demand undiluted,
even heightened, attention in the settlement context."' 7 Accordingly,
the Court held that, while a proposed settlement "is relevant to a
class certification," a settlement class must still satisfy the require-
ments of Rule 23."8
C. Judgments Approving Settlements Must Be Given Full
Faith and Credit
In terms of the role of the objector and the abuses of class-action
settlement procedures, the Supreme Court decided a more important
11. Id. at 23(e).
12. See id. at 23(a), (b).
13. See Matsushita, 116 S. Ct. at 878.
14. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir. 1996); White v.
National Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994); In re A.H. Robins
Co., 880 F.2d 709,740 (4th Cir. 1989).
15. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1995).
16. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
17. Id. at 2248.
1& Id.
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case a year before Amchem. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Epstein,9 the court held that a valid state court judgment approving a
class-action settlement is entitled to full faith and credit in all courts
of the United States.20 In that case, Matsushita made a tender offer
for the common stock of MCA, Inc., a Delaware Corporation. 2' Mat-
sushita acquired MCA but also acquired two lawsuits.' A class ac-
tion was filed in a Delaware state court against MCA and its directors
for breach of fiduciary duty in failing to maximize shareholder value;
Matsushita was later named as an additional defendant on a related
conspiracy claim.22
While that action was pending, an action was filed in a district
court in California, alleging that Matsushita violated federal securi-
ties laws, over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
21
The district court declined to certify the proposed class and granted a
summary judgment in Matsushita's favor.22 The plaintiffs appealed to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.' While that appeal was pending,
the parties in the Delaware action negotiated a settlement.2 7 In ex-
change for a global release of all claims arising out of Matsushita's
acquisition of MCA, defendants would deposit $2 million into a set-
tlement fund for pro rata distribution to class members.? The Dela-
ware court certified a class for settlement purposes and, after notice
to class members and a hearing, the court approved the settlement.
29
The state court's judgment decreed that the settlement barred all
claims, "state or federal," including the California district court ac-
tion."
Matsushita then took the Delaware court's judgment to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and moved to dismiss the case.3'
Matsushita argued that the settlement barred any further prosecution
of the federal action, because federal courts had to give the Delaware
19. 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996).
20. See id. at 878.










31. See id. at 877.
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judgment "full faith and credit," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.32 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, but the Supreme Court re-
versed, stating that:
The Full Faith and Credit Act mandates that the "judicial
proceedings" of any state "shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States ... as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from
which they are taken."33
The Court observed that "a judgment entered in a class action, like
any other judgment entered in a state judicial proceeding, is pre-
sumptively entitled to full faith and credit under the express terms of
the Act.3'M Further, the Court held that this is true even where "the
state court judgment at issue incorporates a class action settlement
releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
35
III. POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE OF CLASS ACTION SETrLEMENTS
In a concurring opinion in Matsushita, Justice Ginsberg foresaw
the potential for abuse created by the Court's holding. She noted the
contention made by objectors to the settlement that the Delaware
class representatives were willing to extinguish the federal claims "for
a meager return to the class members, but a solid fee to the Delaware
class attorneys."36 Justice Ginsberg also quoted the Delaware court's
observation that:
[T]he defendants' willingness to create the settlement funds
seems likely to have been motivated as much by their con-
cern as to their potential liability under the federal claims as
by their concern for liability under the state law claims
which this Court characterized as 'extremely weak.3 7
As Justice Ginsberg implies, the class action settlement presents
a strong temptation for collusion between defendants and class coun-
sel. In exchange for an agreement by a defendant to pay a large
award of attorneys' fees, class counsel can agree to settle class claims
32- See id.
33. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
34. Id. at 878.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 885. On remand, the Ninth Circuit denied full faith and credit to
the Delaware settlement due to deprivation of the absent class members due
process right to adequate representation. See Epstein v. MCA,'Inc., No. 92-
55675, 1997 WL 665545, at 23 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1997).
37. Matsushita, 116 S. Ct. at 887 (quoting In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig.,
C.A. No. 11740, 1993 WL 43024, at *6 (Del. Ch., Feb. 16, 1993)).
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for less than their true value. Then, that defendant can take the court
judgment approving the settlement to every other court of the land
and demand that it be given full faith and credit, forcing the dismissal
of all other class actions.
In the usual lawsuit with only one or two plaintiffs, there are of-
ten divergent interests that protect the plaintiffs rights in a settle-
ment. The plaintiffs counsel has a direct interest in maximizing the
client's recovery-to maximize counsel's own fees if it is a contin-
gency case and to satisfy the client who must approve of the settle-
ment.
However, in a class action there is often no such need to satisfy a
client. The class may consist of millions of members, many of whom
are unaware of the suit, and most of whom do not know, and will
never see, class counsel. Further, the desire to maximize fees by
maximizing the client's recovery becomes less compelling. If a class
has one million members, and they are all paid only $100 in the set-
tlement, the total recovery of the class is $100 million, which allows
for a massive fee award if the attorneys receive even a small percent-
age of the total recovery. Finally, if the award to the class is de-
creased, the ability and willingness of the defendant to satisfy an
award of attorneys' fees may increase.
Accordingly, because a class action can require substantial re-
sources and work if taken to trial, always with a risk of a defense
verdict, the pressures for entering into a collusive settlement are
powerful. Adding to these pressures is the "reverse auction" phe-
nomenon. 8 If plaintiffs' counsel in a class action take too strident a
position in settlement negotiations, the defendant can seek settle-
ment in class actions filed in other jurisdictions. If other counsel are
willing to accept the defendant's deal, the parties enter a settlement,
and if the court approves it, the defendant has a judgment entitled to
full faith and credit. The defendant can then move for dismissal of all
other class actions, leaving the counsel who objected to the settle-
ment without any ability to recover attorneys' fees.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE OBJECTOR IN PREVENTING COLLUSIVE
SETTLEMENTS
The objector's role in preventing collusive settlements is relatively
simple. Rule 23(e) requires that parties to a class action settlement
38. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1370 (1995).
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obtain court approval of the settlement." The objector must,
therefore, attempt to convince the court to reject the settlement by
showing that the settlement is not in the class's interests or that it is
the product of collusion between class counsel and the defendants.'
As an outsider-someone without a stake in the attorneys' fee
award-the objector provides an unbiased view of the settlement to a
court that will otherwise see only a smooth presentation by the
defendants' attorneys and class counsel claiming that the settlement
is fair and reasonable and the product of hard-fought negotiations.
The objector's role can be very costly and risky. Settlement
fairness hearings are often heard in remote areas of the country and
involve complexities and procedural requirements that usually ne-
cessitate representation by counsel.4 And the objector can be subject
to vigorous attack by the proponents of the settlement, who often
have a st ong financial interest in seeing the settlement approved.
Certain temptations further complicate the objector's role. A
defendant attempting to avoid massive exposure, and class counsel
looking to receive a huge award of fees, may try to "buy off' the ob-
jector-in exchange for cash payment to the objector or his counsel,
the objector agrees to withdraw his objections, or even voice ap-
proval of the settlement. In light of the uncompensated expenses an
objector incurs, the buy-off offer is tempting and often significant.
V. THE GENERAL MOTORS SIDE SADDLE FUEL TANK LITIGATION
The General Motors Pickup Truck Side Saddle Fuel Tank Liti-
gation demonstrates all of the problems above. The final chapter of
this litigation has not been written-at least two appeals are pend-
ing-but this case involves allegations of a collusive settlement, ex-
cessive attorneys' fee awards, forum shopping, and objectors who
sold out. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., of Columbia University
School of Law, one of the preeminent national authorities on class
actions, observed in a sworn statement:
It is my opinion (and that of other academics known to me)
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (West 1997).
40. See Stephen E. Morrissey, State Settlement Class Actions that Release Ex-
clusive Federal Claims: Developing a Framework for Multijurisdictional Man-
agement of Shareholder Litigation, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1765, 1766 (1995).
41. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82
VA. L. REV. 1051, 1107 (1996).
42. See generally id. at 1102-15 (discussing the abuse that occurs in settlement
fairness hearings which necessitates representation by counsel).
43. See Morrissey, supra note 40, at 1765-66.
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that this litigation will attain historic significance (and will
be studied in law schools in the future), unfortunately as an
paradigmatic illustration of the case with which the existing
system of rules regulating class actions can break down and
be exploited by attorneys (both for plaintiffs and defen-
dants) who are intent on evading judicial review in other ju-
risdictions.44
A. The Class Actions
Between 1973 and 1987, General Motors manufactured millions
of pickup trucks with side saddle fuel tanks.5 Some allege that the
placement of those fuel tanks is a dangerous defect, leaving the
trucks vulnerable to fuel fires in the event of a side collision.4 6 As
noted previously, Ralph Nader, in No Contest, charged:
Since 1973, more than thirteen hundred people have been
killed in fiery crashes involving pickup trucks that General
Motors manufactured .... More than 650 of these deaths
were caused by fire rather than trauma-that is, the occu-
pant of the truck survived the crash but was burned alive by
the subsequent fire. Critics contend that the location of the
fuel tanks in these trucks renders them unsafe.47
Consumer class actions seeking damages and/or remediation of
the defect were filed against General Motors in numerous state and
federal courts." General Motors responded to these suits by: (1) re-
moving most of the state court actions to United States district
courts, and then (2) filing a motion with the United States Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) to transfer all of the federal
court class actions to one court for consolidation, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407.49 The MDL granted General Motors' motion and
transferred all of the actions to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on February 26, 19930
44. Affidavit of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., of Feb. 4, 1997, White v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., No. 42,865, 1st Jud. Dist. (Iberville Parish, La.), appeals
pending, No. 97/CA/1028, La. Ct. App. (1st Cir.).
45. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768,779 (3d Cir. 1995).
46. See id.
47. NADER & SMITH, supra note 4, at 194 (endnote omitted).
4& See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d at 779.
49. See id.
50. See id.
THE ROLE OF THE OBJECTOR
B. The Settlement
On July 19, 1993, despite allegations that neither side had per-
formed any significant amounts of discovery or investigation, Gen-
eral Motors and class counsel informed the MDL court that they had
reached a settlement agreement.51 Pursuant to the proposed settle-
ment, General Motors would give a "coupon" to the class members.52
Class members could only use those coupons for a limited period of
time as a $1000 credit toward the purchase of a new General Motors
truck.' While ensuring a future market for General Motors trucks,
the settlement made absolutely no provision for repair or retrofit of
the allegedly dangerously positioned fuel tank on the trucks.54 Ac-
cordingly, the class members who were sound enough financially to
purchase new trucks would receive coupons to use as a credit for a
small fraction of the purchase price, while the remaining class mem-
bers who could not afford to buy a new truck-and the unsuspecting
members of the public who would buy the used trucks-were left
with vehicles which could allegedly erupt into a fatal fire. But, de-
spite the lack of any direct monetary award to the class members or
any provision for repair or retrofit, the settlement provided $9.5 mil-
lion in attorneys' fees to class counsel.5
General Motors reached a similar settlement with class counsel
in a Texas class action which had not been removed to federal court.
56
That settlement, also involving $1000 coupons, was approved by the
trial court but was reversed on appeal because of the lack of ade-
quate notice to class members and the size of the attorneys' fee
awardY
C. The Court of Appeals Rejects the Settlement
Approximately four months after the filing of plaintiffs' class-
action complaint in the MDL forum, the district court conditionally
certified the class for settlement and approved the proposed
51. See id. at 780; Gabriella Stem, GM, Truck Owners Settle Fuel-Tank Safety
Suit, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1996, at A3.
52. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d at 780.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 781.
55. See id. at 782.
56. See id. at 780 & n.4.
57. See Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422, 435-36 (Tex. App.
1994), affd 916 S.W.2d 949, 957 (Tex. 1996).
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settlement.58 However, the district court's order was appealed to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which, on April 17, 1995, issued its
decision in In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Products Liability Litigation.9 In that decision, the court of appeals
ruled that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania erred in certifying a provisional settlement class, hold-
ing that a settlement class must satisfy all requisites for certification
under Rule 23,0 a determination subsequently upheld by the Su-
preme Court in the Amchem case.61
More importantly, however, the court of appeals also reversed
the MDL court because it determined that, insofar as the class was
concerned, the settlement "is not fair, reasonable, or adequate."6
This determination was based on a number of factors. The court of
appeals noted that the settlement "involve[d] only non-cash relief,
which is recognized as a prime indicator of suspect settlements." 63
The court observed that class members who received the coupons
might purchase General Motors trucks "because they felt beholden
to use the certificates .... [and therefore] the certificate settlement
might be little more than a sales promotion for GM."' Further, the
court of appeals observed that "[p]eople of lesser financial means will
be unable to benefit comparably from the settlement."' While the
proponents of the settlement claimed that a "secondary market" for
the coupons might develop allowing for sale of the coupons, the court
found that "there is no assurance that a market will develop."'66 The
court of appeals also found that the failure of the proposed settle-
ment to make any provision to remediate the pickup trucks' safety
defect, "despite the vociferousness of the arguments for some recall
or retrofit in the initial complaint, enhances our conviction that this
settlement is inadequate."'67
The negligible value to the class of the proposed settlement was
especially troubling to the court of appeals because "class counsel
58. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d at 781-82.
59. 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
60. See id. at 800.
61. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231,2245 (1997).
62. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d at 818.
63. Id. at 803.
64. Id. at 808.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 809.
67. Id. at 819.
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effected a settlement that would yield very substantial rewards to
them after what, in comparison to the $9.5 million dollar fee, was lit-
tle work."' Indeed, the court of appeals observed that "the size of
the attorneys' fees agreement suggests that GM attached a greater
value to the class claims than proponents of the settlement would
have us believe."69 Reviewing all of these factors, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the settlement "is not fair, reasonable, or ade-
quate."7  Accordingly, the court of appeals vacated the district
court's order certifying the provisional class and approving the set-
tlement and remanded the case for further proceedings.7
D. The Litigation Moves to Louisiana
Rather than return to the district court as ordered, General Mo-
tors and class counsel simply abandoned the MDL court. Specifi-
cally, in documents filed with a Louisiana state court, class counsel
admitted that in October of 1995-the same month in which the
United States Supreme Court denied General Motors' petition for
certiorari of the Third Circuit decision 72 -General Motors and class
counsel began settlement negotiations in Louisiana. 3
In 1993 plaintiffs filed a "statewide" class action in the Parish of
Iberville, Louisiana, in a small, rural court in the sparsely populated
city of Plaquemine. 4 General Motors, on or about May 21, 1993, ap-
pealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal from an order certifying the
class, and the case was then allowed to lie dormant for three years. 5
However, after the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected the settlement,76 General Motors moved for an order staying
its Louisiana appeal and remanding the case to the Louisiana trial
court for settlement purposes only.'
On or about July 3, 1996, General Motors and class counsel
announced that they had agreed to a nationwide settlement in the
68. Id. at 803.
69. Id. at 807.
70. Id. at 818.
71. See id. at 822-23.
72. See General Motors Corp. v. French, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
73. See In re Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 961, 1996
WL 683785, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1996).
74. See id. at *2.
75. See id. at *2-3.
76. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822-23 (3rd Cir. 1995).
77. See In re Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 1996 WL 683785, at
*2-3.
January 1998]
422 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:409
Louisiana action.78 This settlement included all of the actions trans-
ferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania by the MDL and awarded fees to class counsel for the
work performed in the district court proceedings.79 Interestingly,
many of the objectors to the settlement in the Third Circuit, including
Public Citizen and the Center for Auto Safety, were now proponents
of the settlement in Louisiana.' ° Additionally, many of the attorneys
who represented those objectors were now among the attorneys who
would share attorneys' fees as part of the settlement.81
E. The $1000 Coupon Settlement Lives Again in Louisiana
The "new" settlement advanced in Louisiana appeared, with the
exception of a few changes, almost identical to the settlement re-
jected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.2 Indeed, one of the
class counsel wrote to his clients: "[T]he $1,000 coupon settlement
lives again in Louisiana." The new settlement provided only for the
same non-cash relief to class members-a $1000 coupon which was
good only for a limited period of time as a credit toward the purchase
of any new General Motors vehicle, except a Saturn, the previous
coupon being only good for new GM trucks and minivans.' The class
members who either could not afford or did not want to purchase a
new General Motors vehicle received no certain benefit from the new
settlement. Provisions were added which would supposedly make the
coupons easier to sell, but even the settlement proponents claimed
that the sale value would only be about $100, and they refused to guar-
antee any cash value.' The new settlement still did absolutely nothing
to remediate the purportedly serious safety defect in the trucks."
78. See Stem, supra note 51, at A3.
79. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Public Citizen's Involvement in Class Action Set-
tlements (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.citizen.org/public citizen/litigation/
briefs/class_act.html#gmlouisiana>.
80. See Stem, supra note 51, at A3.
81. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Public Citizen's Involvement in Class Action Set-
tlements (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.citizen.org/publiccitizen/litigation/
briefs/class _act.html#gmlouisiana>.
82. See Stem, supra note 51, at A3.
83. Letter from Derek S. Casey to Robert West (Aug. 28, 1996) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
84. See Stem, supra note 51, at A3.
85. See Public Citizen, Public Citizen's Involvement in Class Action Settle-
ments (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.citizen.org/pubie-citizen/litigation/
briefs/class-act.html#gmlouisiana>
86. See Stem, supra note 51, at A3.
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But, the new settlement tripled the amount of attorneys' fees.
They would now receive $26,075,000Y
F. Attempts to Stop the Louisiana Settlement
To a number of objectors-at least those whose attorneys did
not benefit from the new settlement's fee award-it appeared that
General Motors and class counsel were forum shopping." General
Motors had steered the action to the Third Circuit by removing to the
federal courts most of the actions filed in state courts around the
country, via a transfer and consolidation order from the MDL."9 But
when the Third Circuit would not approve the settlement, General
Motors and class counsel attempted to thwart its order by simply
making a few arguably insubstantial changes to the settlement and
taking it to a different court which would accept it. Relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita, they could then argue that
the settlement had to be given full faith and credit in all courts of the
land-including the Third Circuit. °
The objectors responded to this apparent forum shopping by
launching a two-fronted attack on the new settlement. First, they
filed written objections to the settlement with the Louisiana state
court, along with motions to intervene in the action, and eventually
appeared at a fairness hearing on November 6, 1996, in Plaquemine,
Louisiana." Second, they filed an emergency application with the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking an order staying the Louisi-
ana proceedings.' Specifically, objectors argued that the Louisiana
court was attempting to relitigate a previous federal court judgment
and was seeking to frustrate the court of appeals' prior order reject-
ing the settlement.' They argued that the All Writs Acte" authorizes a
federal court to enjoin state court proceedings in such circumstances.95
87. See Richard B. Schmitt, Justice RFD: Big Suits Land in Rural Courts,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1996, at B1.
88. See In re Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 961, 1996
WL 683785, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1996).
89. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 779 (3d Cir. 1995).
90. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873, 878 (1996).




94. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994).
95. See In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 (2d Cir.
1993); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328,335 (2d Cir. 1985).
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The Third Circuit transferred the emergency applications to the
district court for its consideration.96 District Court Judge William H.
Yohn, Jr., set the applications for hearing on November 20, 199627
However, the fairness hearing in Louisiana was set for November 6,
1996." It was therefore possible that the Louisiana court could issue
a decision approving the settlement on a nationwide basis before
Judge Yohn had an opportunity to stay the Louisiana proceedings. If
this happened, General Motors and class counsel could argue that the
Louisiana court's judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in the
Third Circuit, foreclosing any proceedings there.
Informed of these concerns, Judge Yohn agreed to telephone the
Louisiana court and ask it to refrain from issuing any decision on the
settlement until the applications were heard on November 20. The
court informed the objectors that the Louisiana court agreed to this
request.' Still, Judge Yohn had not said when he would issue his
decision on the applications, so the objectors still worried that a
Louisiana judgment could issue before Judge Yohn made his deci-
sion.
In a last ditch attempt to avoid this result and to ensure that the
courts of the Third Circuit had a meaningful opportunity to review
the settlement proceedings, some of the objectors employed a viable,
but seldom used, procedural maneuver. Federal decisional authority
has held that the All Writs Act, in addition to allowing orders enjoin-
ing state court proceedings, also allowed removal of state court pro-
ceedings to the federal court, even where removal would not be al-
lowed under the federal removal statutes.10
Consequently, on November 19, 1996, the objectors filed a notice
of removal of the Louisiana state court proceedings in the closest
U.S. district court, the Middle District of Louisiana (Middle Dis-
trict)."° That same day, the objectors filed an emergency application
with the MDL-its jurisdiction only being over federal court ac-
tions-seeking an order transferring the action from the district court






101. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d at 1431;
Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1988).
102. See Declaration of Robert B. Gerard, Esq., at 4, White v. General Motors
Corp., No. 96-7490-A-2 (M.D. La. 1997).
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in Louisiana back to Judge Yobn of the District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania.W
G. Court Approves the Settlement
The objectors' efforts soon proved futile. On November 25,
1996, District Court Judge Yohn issued an order denying the appli-
cations for an emergency stay.'°' Judge Yobn held that neither the
All Writs Act' 5 nor the Anti-Injunction Acte' empowered him to stay
the Louisiana proceedings." 7 Then, on December 2, 1996, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted a
motion to remand the previously removed proceedings back to the
Louisiana state court. The district court held that the only proper
court to exercise jurisdiction under the All Writs Act was the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and
that court had now declined to exercise jurisdiction in its November
25 order denying the applications."
Finally, on December 19, 1996, Judge Jack T. Marionneaux of
the Louisiana state court issued a decision approving the General
Motors settlement.' 9 Judge Marionneaux held that a settlement class
could be certified without having to satisfy all requirements of Rule
23(a) and (b) and held that the settlement was fair and reasonable.'
H. The Aftermath
An appeal has been filed with the Third Circuit seeking review
of the district court's decision denying the applications to stay the
Louisiana state court proceedings, or at least enjoining the MDL
103. See Declaration of Robert B. Gerard, Esq., White v. General Motors
Corp., No. 96-7490-A-2 (M.D. La. 1997).
104. See In re Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 961, 1996
WL 683785, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1996).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1996) (stating that a United States court may not grant
an injunction of state court proceedings except: (1) as expressly authorized by
Congress; or (2) where necessary to aid its jurisdiction; or (3) to protect or effec-
tuate the court's judgment).
107. See In re Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Lifig., 1996 WL 683785, at
*13-14.
108. See Ruling on Motions to Strike or for Refaand at 4, White v. General
Motors Corp., No. 96-7490-A.
109. See Final Order and Judgment, White v. General Motors Corp., No.
42,865, 1st Jud. Dist. (Iberville Parish, La.), appeals pending No. 97/LA/1028, La.
Ct. App. (1st Cir.).
110. See id.
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litigants and their attorneys from participating in the benefits of the
Louisiana proceedings.111 The Third Circuit has heard oral arguments
and should issue a decision shortly. An appeal has also been filed
with the Louisiana State Court of Appeal, seeking reversal of Judge
Marionneaux's order approving the settlement."' That appeal is still
in the briefing stage.
Barring reversal by one of the courts of appeal, General Motors
and class counsel will have successfully accomplished a remarkable
tour de force. Despite a federal court of appeals' order rejecting the
settlement, General Motors will have limited its liability to class
members to the $1000 coupons, and class counsel will receive
$26,075,000 in fees. On the other hand, the class, at the time of the
Louisiana Fairness Hearing, would get no guaranteed cash payment,
and millions of pickup trucks with a potentially life-threatening de-
fect would remain on the road without any attempt at repair.
The objectors to the Louisiana settlement are left with nothing.
Despite the significant expenses inherent in attending hearings in
Louisiana and Philadelphia, in filing applications and memoranda in
the federal and state courts, and in filing the two appeals, the objec-
tors have nothing to show for their efforts-other than their $1000
coupons.
Indeed, counsel for the objectors who filed the notice of removal
faced a motion by class counself purportedly seeking millions of
dollars in sanctions for the "wrongful removal.1 .4 This motion was
not filed in the district court having jurisdiction over the removal
proceedings but was filed, after the federal court's remand order, in
the slate court, where class counsel apparently believed that it had a
more sympathetic judge. After a number of hearings and a brief turf
war between the federal court and the state court when the federal
court learned of the motion for sanctions, class counsel withdrew
their motion. However, objectors' counsel, who receive no payment
111. See Declaration of Robert B. Gerard, Esq., White v. General Motors
Corp., No. 96-7490-A-2 (M.D. La. 1997).
112. See Notice of Appeal, White v. General Motors Corp., No. 42,865, 1st
Jud. Dist. (Iberville Parish, La.), appeals pending, No. 97/CA/1028, La. Ct. App.
(1st Cir.).
113. See Motion for Sanctions, White v. General Motors Corp., No. 42,865, 1st
Jud. Dist. (Iberville Parish, La.), appeals pending, No. 97/LA/1028, La. Ct. App.
(1st Cir.).
114. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions at 4-5, White v.
General Motors Corp., No. 42,865, 1st Jud. Dist. (Iberville Parish, La.), appeals
pending, No. 97/LA/1028, La. Ct. App. (1st Cir.).
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in the case, and who were suddenly faced with a million-dollar sanc-
tion motion, certainly received a very effective and chilling message
about the potential risks of interfering with a high-stakes settlement.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM AND ITS
PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL MOTORS TRUCK FUEL TANK
LITIGATION
The General Motors litigation demonstrated the role of the pub-
lic interest group as objector. Public Citizen, a group founded by
Ralph Nader, was one of the original objectors to the settlement in
Philadelphia. However, it later became a supporter of the settlement
in the Louisiana proceedings. The chronicle of the evolution of Pub-
lic Citizen from objector to supporter is, interestingly enough, still
available on Public Citizen's Internet web page, entitled "Public Citi-
zen's Involvement in Class Action Settlements." The following
quoted excerpt is from that web page:
GM TRUCK CASE (PHILADELPHIA).
A. CITE: In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel
Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3rd Cir. '1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 88 (1995).
B. CASE DESCRIPTION: In settlement of a nationwide class
action to obtain repair damages or retrofit of the 5-6 million
side-saddle fuel tank GM Trucks, class members were to re-
ceive a $1,000 coupon, good for 15 months, toward the pur-
chase of a new GM Truck or minivan. The class included
truck owners in all states but Texas. Additionally, class
members could transfer the coupon to third parties, but then
the coupon was worth only $500 and could not be used in
conjunction with the ubiquitous GM rebates and credit
deals. There were other restrictions on the $500 coupon
which made it virtually worthless. The settling parties' ex-
pert himself conceded that 54% of the class members would
get nothing at all from the settlement; that expert, however,
made statements [that were] demonstrably wrong and our
experts (Jack Gillis, Dr. Paul Bloom of Univ. of N. Carolina,
and Clarence Ditlow) had the better of the arguments. We
believed that no more than 10% of the class members would
get any value.
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The district court awarded $9.5 million in fees and $500,000
in expenses.
C. PUBLIC CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT: We were the principal
objectors-representing oursel[ves], the Center for Auto
Safety, and numerous class members-in the district court
(although-there were about one-half dozen other objector
groups, including various governments (e.g., New York,
New York City, Pennsylvania)). We especially took the lead
in providing evidence concerning retrofit options and the
valuelessness of the settlement to the vast majority of the
class.
We were never even served with the fee application, as
class counsel decided only to serve GM! There was no
hearing on fees and we were, thus, shocked when the court
approved the mammoth request. In addition to this prob-
lem (and the size of the fee award), there are other peculi-
arities with the fees that should have been addressed. One
example will suffice: After the settlement was struck, sev-
eral plaintiffs' attorneys who had similar pending state court
class actions had their cases magically transferred to the
federal action, and they joined in the fee application. They
apparently did nothing to improve the settlement or ad-
vance their clients' cause. Why did the settling parties do
this?...
D. STATUS: This settlement was approved by the district
court in Philadelphia and was argued on August 11, 1994 be-
fore a Third Circuit panel which asked questions for over
four hours. A smashing victory was handed down on April
17, 1995. The court rejected the settling parties' claims about
the value of the settlement (using many of the arguments we
had advanced), questioned a settlement that did nothing to fix
the trucks (again using our evidence about retrofit), and
severely questioned the fee arrangements. The court also, for
more than 60 pages, tightened the standards applicable to
settlement class actions. GM (but not class counsel) peti-
tioned the Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit's de-
cision. We drafted the opposition to GM's Supreme Court
brief (in which the other non-governmental objectors
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joined). The petition was denied on October 3, 1995. After
that, we continued our efforts to participate in the [ongoing
litigation] and are working toward a favorable resolution.
See discussion of GM Truck Case (Louisiana),... below.
E. PCLG CONTACTS: Brian Wolfman, David Vladeck.
GM TRUCK CASE (TEXAS)
A. CITE: Bloyed v. General Motors, 881 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.
[]App. 1994), affd and remanded, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex.
1996).
B. CASE DESCRIPTION: This is the same case as the Phila-
delphia GM settlement, except the settlement was to apply
only to truck owners in Texas. Thus, the settlement was
identical to the one struck in Philadelphia for the other 49
states. One might ask: why did this settlement exist? The
only reason we could come up with that made any sense was
that the two law firms in the Texas case simply did not want
to share the mere $10 million fee in the Philadelphia case.
Why did GM agree to this when it could have wrapped up
the whole nation, including Texas, in Philadelphia. The only
plausible explanation that we can think of is that, by settling
separately with the folks in Texas, GM was able to buy off
potential opposition in the nationwide case. The two Texas
law firms asked for $9 million in fees and about $500,000 in
expenses; in other words, almost as much as 25 law firms
and dozens of lawyers asked for in the Philadelphia action.
Astoundingly, GM did not oppose this extraordinary fee re-
quest, and the class counsel did not notify the class of the
amount (or even an approximate amount) of the fee that
they were seeking.
C. PUBLIC CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT: When we became
aware of the GM case in Philadelphia, we were working on
very short notice and, with the Center for Auto Safety,
wrote objections and developed some nice expert affidavits.
Rather than formally enter the Texas case, we simply
shipped our brief and evidence down to a consumer lawyer
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in Texas who used much of our stuff.
We lost in the trial court, won in a wonderful opinion in
the Texas Court of Appeals, and the settling parties' discre-
tionary appeal to the Texas Supreme Court was accepted af-
ter being urged to do so in amicus briefs by both the Texas
Trial Lawyers' Association and the Texas Association of
Defense Counsel. During the merits briefing, we wrote an
amicus brief for Public Citizen, Consumers Union, and Con-
sumer Federation of America (we actually did two substan-
tive sections on the settlement and fees, and Steve Baugh-
man of Baron & Budd did an introductory section on class
action jurisprudence, which we helped to edit). Our brief
was referred to repeatedly in the Texas Supreme Court ar-
gument (which we have on tape).
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed and remanded.
The Court first held that the Court of Appeals should not
have held the settlement to be unfair on the ground that it
was a marketing bonanza for GM. The Court believed that
the plaintiffs may have gotten nothing in the case if it had
gone to trial. The Supreme Court scrapped the settlement
nonetheless, holding that counsel has a responsibility to no-
tify the class members of the amount sought in fees, because
the clients have an important interest in knowing how the
settlement is divided between the relief and fee compo-
nents. The settlement was thrown out on this ground alone.
The Court went on to hold that procedures different from
those used by the trial court initially had to be used on re-
mand. First, the Court stated that the class can only be cer-
tified for settlement purposes if it can be certified for trial,
adopting the Third Circuit's General Motors holding. Sec-
ond, the settling parties must sustain their burden of prov-
ing the fairness of the settlement through live testimony, not
simply affidavits. Finally, the Court criticized the fees in the
case. It questioned the amount of the fee-which it noted
amounted to $1,500 per hour-and demanded an explanation
as to why a separate settlement and fee was necessary in ad-
dition to the nationwide settlement in Philadelphia.
D. STATUS: This case was subsumed by the Louisiana GM
Truck class action,.., discussed below.
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E. PCLG CONTACTS: Brian Wolfman, David Vladeck.
GM TRUCK CASE (LOUISIANA)
A. CITE: White v. General Motors Corp., No. 42,865, 1st
Jud. Dist. (Iberville Parish, La.), appeals pending, No.
97/CA11028, La. Ct. App. (1st Cir.)
B. CASE DESCRIPTION: This is a nationwide class action
involving the same GM truck defects as in the Philadelphia
and Texas class actions, described fully... above.
C. PUBLIC CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT: After the Third Circuit
rejected the Philadelphia GM settlement.., and talks to re-
solve the federal MDL case broke down, plaintiffs' counsel
turned to a dormant Louisiana action, led by attorney Mike
Crow of New Orleans. We met with Crow and other plain-
tiffs' lawyers, at their request, to express our concerns. A
settlement was crafted which, although not entirely to our
liking, we decided to support.
On the safety side, the settlement provides $4 million
to study vehicle fuel system safety funded by a trustee,
wholly independent of GM. Our client, the Center for Auto
Safety, was concerned that this fund would provide little
[value to] the class members because, under the terms of the
settlement, the money could not be used to study vehicles
more than five years old (including, therefore, the trucks at
issue here). Therefore, the Center, with our assistance, ne-
gotiated a companion settlement with class counsel in which
$1 million of counsel's attorney's fees will fund safety stud-
ies intended to lead to develop a fix for to [sic] GM trucks.
In terms of economic value, the settlement provides
coupons of up to $1,000 toward the purchase of almost any
new GM vehicle. (In the prior settlements, the coupons
could only be used to buy trucks and vans.) The principal
difference from the Philadelphia and Texas settlements is
that steps have been taken to provide a secondary market in
the coupons. In fact, two companies have shown consider-
able interest in participating in the notice efforts and help-
ing to create that market. The certificate is good for 33
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months (more than twice as long as the certificate in the
prior settlements). During the first 15 months the coupon is
transferable through a process that requires endorsement
(but not the naming of a specific transferee in advance nor
notarization). During the final 18 months the coupon's
value is discounted but it becomes a bearer coupon which
could easily be sold on a secondary market.
As to attorney's fees, counsel for plaintiffs in all the
prior actions and the Louisiana action sought approximately
$24 million. We worked out a separate written agreement
with class counsel to tie the payment of fees to the class re-
covery. Thus, as soon as the fee is paid, class counsel will
deposit $10 million of that fee in escrow, which can only be
withdrawn in full if the plaintiffs can prove that 100,000
class members have transferred their coupons on the secon-
dary market for at least $100 each.
Public Citizen also moved separately for attorney's fees
of approximately $215,000 for our work in the Philadelphia
and Louisiana cases.
The trial court approved the settlement and the fee re-
quest on December 20, 1996. The trial judge asked at that
time for briefs from objectors' attorneys on how a $1.2 mil-
lion fund for payment of objectors' fees should be allocated.
The court has yet to rule on that issue.
D. STATUS: Several objectors appealed the settlement ap-
proval and a briefing schedule was set in May 1997. No ar-
gument date has been set.
E. PCLG CONTACTS: Brian Wolfman, David Vladeck."5
The contrast between Public Citizen's descriptions of the settle-
ments in Philadelphia and Louisiana is striking, and many things are
left unexplained. For example:
1. Real value of the coupon to class members: Is it still Public
Citizen's position that the $1000 coupon will not provide any real re-
lief to ninety percent of the class?
115. Public Citizen, Public Citizen's Involvement in Class Action Settlements
(visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.citizen.org/public.citizen/litigation/ briefs/cl-
assact.html#gmlouisiana> (emphasis added).
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2. Class counsel's attorneys' fees: Public Citizen described the
$9.5 million fee award in Philadelphia as a "Mammoth Request." At-
torneys' fees in Louisiana now requested and awarded are in excess
of $24 million. What is Public Citizen's position now? Notably they
are requesting $250,000 in fees for their participation in this coupon
settlement.
3. Retrofit of alleged dangerous fiuel tanks: Although Public Citi-
zen took the lead in providing evidence concerning retrofit options,"6
the Louisiana settlement does not provide for any retrofit to class
members' trucks. However, there is a $4 million fund included within
this settlement to study fuel tank safety issues involving vehicles
other than those that are the subject of this litigation. Because of the
obvious lack of benefit to class members in allowing the use of $4
million of their settlement fund for research on fuel tank safety issues
in vehicles not involved in their case, Public Citizen assisted in nego-
tiating a $1 million donation from class counsel's fees to fund a study
on fuel tank safety for class members' General Motors Trucks. One
can only infer that a retrofit study involving only twenty-five percent
of research funds from the post-coupon settlement is akin to the
opening of a barn door with an absentee horse. It is difficult to com-
prehend how Public Citizen can tacitly approve the Louisiana coupon
settlement and an award in excess of $24 million in attorneys' fees in
light of its prior and successful objections to the Philadelphia and
Texas General Motors cases. Certainly, this change of position dem-
onstrates the complexities inherent in the role of the objector.
VII. CONCLUSION: NEED FOR REFORM
As noted above, the final chapter in the General Motors litiga-
tion has not been written. An opportunity still exists for the Third
Circuit to curtail the use of class action settlement procedures in this
case, settlement procedures that on their face create an appearance
of impropriety. In the meantime, the authors have some suggestions
for reforming this area of the law.
First, the courts have statutory authority over the approval of
class action settlements, and the courts should more diligently exer-
cise that authority. A court should act "as a fiduciary who must serve
116. See Public Citizen, Public Citizen's Involvement in Class Action Settle-
ments: GM Truck Case (Philadelphia) (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http:/vww.citi-
zen.org/publicsitizen/litigation/briefs/class act.html#gmlouisiana>.
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as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.""' 7 In particular,
courts must carefully scrutinize the adequacy and fidelity of the class
representatives. As Justice Ginsberg observed, "in the class action
setting, adequate representation is among the due process ingredients
that must be supplied if the judgment is to bind absent class mem-
bers. ,, .
Second, attorneys' fee awards to class counsel must undergo
closer scrutiny and should more closely reflect both the amount of
work actually performed by the attorneys and the benefit to individ-
ual class members. Courts must recognize the temptation created by
huge awards of attorneys' fees to class counsel. "When the class at-
torneys succeed in reaping 'a golden harvest of fees' in a case involv-
ing a relatively small recovery, the judicial system and the legal pro-
fession are disparaged.'
1 9
Third, the appointment of a regional class action Special Master
or Referee upon each class action filing would help offset the inher-
ent problems of the forum shopping reverse auction. The Special
Master or Referee could monitor filings throughout the country, in
both federal and state jurisdictions, and make appropriate recom-
mendations, such as:
(1) consolidation of actions;
(2) implementation of an interview and application process
for proposed class counsel (including a fee proposal); and
(3) monitoring of objectors to proposed settlements to as-
sure that any proposed payment to them by class counsel
and the settling defendant is fair, based upon some tangible
added value to class members.
Finally, the assignment of a qualified, independent individual to
act as a guardian to protect the interests of the absent class mem-
ber-much like the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a minor's
action-would provide an important safeguard. It would restore a
"true client" to a process which otherwise appears to be driven by
class counsel's fees and class representative incentives.
Class action litigation serves a valuable and economical role in mass
tort and claim cases. However, class actions are easily orchestrated to
117. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Grunin v. International House of Pan-
cakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975)).
118. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873, 885 (1996).
119. Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1144 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Free
World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26,30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
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supply favorable settlements to wealthy organizations, large fees to
clever and connected counsel, and, unfortunately, less than wholesale
justice to class members' claims. It is our opinion that with the ap-
propriate safeguards, the "client" can return to the table and ask the
appropriate question: "Why have your fees tripled to over $26 mil-
lion when all I still get is this lousy coupon?"
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